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Resilient Synchronization Strategy for AC
Microgrids Under Cyber Attacks
Subham Sahoo, Member, IEEE, Yongheng Yang, Senior Member, IEEE and Frede Blaabjerg, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Although distributed control in microgrids is well-
known for reliability and scalability, the absence of a global
monitoring entity makes it highly vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Considering that the detection of cyber attacks becomes fairly
easy for distributed observers, a well-planned set of balanced
attacks, commonly termed as stealth attack, can always bypass
these observers with the control objectives being successfully
met. In this letter, a mitigation technique is thus introduced
to remove stealth attack on the frequency control input in AC
microgrids. The mitigation is carried out using a novel event-
driven attack-resilient controller for N cooperative grid-forming
converters (GfCs), which guarantees resilient synchronization for
up to N−1 attacked units. Finally, the resilience capabilities and
robustness of the proposed controller are discussed and verified
under various scenarios.
Index Terms—Grid-forming inverters, cyber attacks, dis-
tributed control, cyber-physical systems, AC microgrids.
I. INTRODUCTION
GRID-forming converters (GfCs) are an integral asset inthe power electronic energy paradigm, as they serve as
one of the most common energy conversion interfaces between
renewable energy sources and the grid [1]. To enhance system
reliability in the islanded mode of operation, multiple GfCs
are usually employed to share the active and reactive power
demand. To achieve more flexibility in control under transmis-
sion delays and information failures, cooperative/distributed
controllers with robust performance towards cyber layer im-
perfections are preferred in recent times. However, distributed
control brings large concern in the form of cyber attacks due
to the omnipresence of communication links leaving behind
vulnerable spots [2]. Such man-made hazards could easily lead
to loss of synchronization, which unnecessarily activates the
protection relays, leading to converter(s) outage.
To address this issue, a trust and confidence-based resilient
control protocol was introduced in [3] for GfCs in AC micro-
grids. However, the online calculation of these factors, which
involves additional layers of integration and division opera-
tions, assigns high computational burden. Moreover, to provide
attack-resilient operation, it requires a minimum of half of the
neighboring converters to be trustworthy, thereby limiting its
resilience capability for worst-case attacks. Additionally in [4],
the information received from the attacked unit(s) has been
discarded by disabling the corresponding cyber link as an
elementary approach to prevent the propagation of attack into
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Fig. 1. Single-line diagram of a cyber-physical system consisting of N grid-
forming converters (GfCs) managed by a cooperative cyber topology–cyber
attack (in red bolts) launched into local control input.
the non-compromised units. As a result, the cyber network
connectivity is affected, which leads to disruption in the
consensus theory. Another cybersecure framework is proposed
in [5], which mandates a specific connectivity criterion for
the communication graph to ensure resilient operation of AC
microgrid. Further in [6], a partial primal-dual algorithm is
determined to detect the presence of stealth node and link
attacks. However, it is limited to detection only, without
providing any comprehensive steps of countermeasures to
mitigate the attack element(s). In [7], a resilient framework
for unbounded cyber attacks in AC microgrid is presented.
However, the resilient control update is introduced using an
hidden control layer, which can still be infiltrated by an
attacker conducting a stealth attack with sufficient system
information. To the best of authors’ knowledge, the ability
to mitigate stealth attacks [8] in AC microgrids has never
been discussed.
Hence, this letter introduces the mitigation of stealth attacks
in cooperative AC microgrids. An asynchrony index based
detection metric is proposed to detect the presence of attack
signals in the frequency control input and immediately return
an authentication signal to trigger the event-driven mitigation
strategy. The mitigation strategy then reconstructs a trustwor-
thy frequency signal and replaces it with the attacked signal.
As opposed to the prior-art method, the proposed strategy can
maintain resilient synchrony in the system only using a single
trustworthy GfC.
Fig. 2. Case study for N = 4 GfCs – Attacker conducts a balanced attack
first to deceive the system operator and then conducts an unbalanced attack
resulting in operation outside the allowable range.
II. EVENT-DRIVEN RESILIENT SYNCHRONIZATION
As shown in Fig. 1, the kth GfC consists of a DC source
(e.g., renewable energy or energy storage systems), an inverter
bridge, a LCL filter and a controller using local measurements.
In the system shown in Fig. 1 comprising of N agents, each
communication digraph is represented via edges to constitute
an adjacency matrix A = [akj ] ∈ RN×N , where the com-
munication weights are given by: akj > 0, if (ψk, ψj) ∈ E,
where E is an edge connecting two nodes with ψk and ψj
being the local and neighboring node, respectively. Otherwise,
akj = 0. Nk = {j|(ψk, ψj) ∈ E} denotes the set of all
neighbors of kth agent. Further, the in-degree matrix Zin
= diag{zin} is a diagonal matrix with its elements given by
zin =
∑
j∈Nk akj . Further, the Laplacian matrix L is defined
as L = Zin − A.
To improve their performance, neighboring GfCs’ measure-
ments, which are transmitted to the local GfC and vice-versa,
are used in a cooperative secondary controller to regulate
their respective bus’ average voltage V̄k and frequency ωk.
The control objectives of the cooperative controller can be
mathematically represented as:
lim
t→∞
ωk(t) = ω
∗, lim
t→∞
V̄k(t) = V
∗, ∀ k ∈ N (1)
where ω∗ and V ∗ denote the global reference for frequency
and voltage, respectively. Detailed control equations of coop-
erative secondary controller in AC microgrids can be referred
from [9]. To achieve proportionate active power sharing along-
with frequency restoration, the primary layer droop control is
modified into:
ωk(t) = ω
∗ −mk(Pk(t)− P refk (t)) (2)
where mk, Pk and P
ref
k denote the active power droop co-
efficient, measured active power and secondary control active
power reference in the kth agent, respectively. Basically, P refk
compensates for the error introduced by the droop coefficient
in (2). This is done using:
Ṗ refk (t) = k1(ω
∗ − ωk(t)) + k2
∑
j∈Nk
akj(yj(t)− yk(t)) (3)
with k1 and k2 being positive variables and y = mP .
Substituting (3) in (2) for all the agents and multiplying L in
both sides, we obtain Lω(t) = 0 for (1) to hold true.
However, the objectives in (1) can be misconstrued in the
presence of cyber attacks on the frequency signal in the kth
agent using:
ωfk (t) = ωk(t) + κω
a
k (4)
where κ = 1 denotes the presence of an attack element ωak
in the kth agent, or 0 otherwise. Further, these attacks can
be conducted in a coordinated manner to deceive the system
operator using:
ω̇(t) = −(Lω(t) + ωa) (5)
where ω and ωa denote column matrices of the measured
frequency and attack signal for N GfCs, respectively.
Remark I: Considering the attack model in (5), the attack
can be termed as:
1) balanced attack, if ω̇(t) = 0. Such attacks always lead
to a stable and feasible solution, thereby satisfying the
objectives in (1). More details on the design of stealth
attacks in AC microgrids can be referred from [6].
2) unbalanced attack, if ω̇(t) 6= 0. They disregard the
objectives in (1).
Remark II: Based on the definition of balanced attacks,
it can be concluded that
∑N
k=1 ω
a
k = 0 for cooperative
synchronization holds true. Conversely,
∑N
k=1 ω
a
k 6= 0 for
unbalanced attacks.
A case study is carried out in Fig. 2 on an AC microgrid with
N = 4 GfCs to show the impact of balanced and unbalanced
attacks on frequency control input. When an attack of ωa
= 2π{0.05, 0, -0.05, 0} rad/s is introduced at t = 1.5 s,
the frequency and active power of each agent converge back
to the corresponding references, as defined in the control
objectives. As per Remark I, all the necessary conditions are
met, which certifies it as a balanced attack. However, at t
= 3.5 s, the attacker maintains this discretion and increases
one attack element in ωa = 2π{10, 0, -0.05, 0} rad/s. As a
result, it can be seen that ω1 immediately goes outside the
boundary of operation [49.5, 50.5] Hz (as highlighted in Fig.
2) defined for the microgrid. As the frequencies reach close
to the aforementioned threshold, it could unnecessarily lead to
the activation of protective relays, which could cause shutdown
of the microgrid.
To detect the presence of such attack elements in AC
microgrids, we consider the vector representation of a balanced
attack (defined in Remark I) upon substituting (2) in (5) to get:
Lω∗ − LmP + LmPref + ωa = 0 (6)
where ω∗Nx1, mNxN , PNx1 and ωaNx1 denote the vector rep-
resentation of ω∗, mk, Pk and ωak , respectively. Since ω
∗ is
constant for the whole microgrid, the first term in (6) can be
eliminated with L being a symmetric matrix.
Further based on the timescale separation between the
primary and secondary control layer, LmP = 0, by virtue of
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Fig. 3. Proposed resilient synchronization strategy in kth agent to mitigate balanced/unbalanced attacks in AC microgrid.
the dynamics of primary layer with Lω already converging to
zero. Hence, we get:
LmPref + ωa = 0. (7)
Remark III: Using Remark II, every non-zero element(s) in
ωa representing the attack signals will reflect an asymmetric
relationship with LmPref for (7) to hold true. Hence, this
asymmetry becomes the basis of detection for balanced and
unbalanced attacks in cooperative AC microgrids.
Accounting the asynchrony in Pref under the presence of
attacks, this letter proposes a novel detection metric, termed
as asynchrony index AIk, to detect possible cyber attacks in
the kth agent using:
AIk = lk[
∑
jεNk
akj(P
ref
j − P
ref
k )][
∑
jεNk
akj(P
ref
j + P
ref
k )]. (8)
Remark IV: Using Remark III, any value beyond an adaptive
detection threshold γ in (8) confirms the presence of an attack
element in kth agent.
To improve the transient performance under attacked sce-
narios, an adaptive detection threshold γk has been designed
such that the detection mechanism can be given by:
||AIk|| > β
∑
j∈Nk
||akj(Pj − Pk)||+ β0︸ ︷︷ ︸
γk
(9)
where β and β0 are positive values. It is worth notifying
that the first term in γk and β0 improves the detection
performance during transients and steady-state condition, re-
spectively. Since γk is designed using the active power mea-
surement Pk, which is obtained from a low-pass filter with a
cut-off frequency ωci [9], the effect of measurement noise is
reduced drastically. Following any disturbance in microgrids,
the transients could affect the detection mechanism with a
static threshold value. To address this issue, this letter employs
a state-dependent adaptive threshold to provide accurate detec-
tion performance during both static and dynamic conditions.
Further, the variance of noise in the measurements for a given
system can be used as a good indicator to decide the minimum
value of β0 in advance.
Finally, to counteract against these attacks, this letter uses
an event-driven signal reconstruction based mitigation strategy
based on a follow-up signal from AIk. Upon detection of
the presence of attack element in kth agent, an authentication
label Ωk is generated for frequency in kth agent to alarm the
presence of attack element (denoted as an event in this letter).
It should be noted that the nature of this authentication label
is binary, such that:
Ωk =
{
0(F), if ||AIk|| > γk
1(T), else
(10)
To simplify the representation of authentication of the signals
in x = {ω, P}, xT and xF will be used to symbolize
True (uncompromised) and False (comprommised) for the
corresponding signals using (10), respectively.
As long as (10) holds True, the compromised frequency
signal is forced to follow the trajectories of non-compromised
neighboring signals (with Ωj labeled as True). As highlighted
in Fig. 3, if the set of authentication signals Θk for kth agent
is not a zero matrix (matrix comprising of signals x, only
labeled with F as per (10)) in the presence of attack elements,
event-driven resilient signals can be reconstructed using:
ωk(te) = Ξ[ω
T
j (t)] (11)
where ωk(te) (with e as the triggering instant) denote the
event-triggered samples of frequency in kth agent. It is worth
notifying that Ξ[xj(t)] in (11) is a triggering function, which
holds the input signal until the next instant of triggering.
In (11), the input signals are the frequency of neighboring
measurements ωTj with authentication labeled as T. The event-
driven signals are generated only when the detection mecha-
nism in (9) holds true in the attacked agent. In particular, a
trigger is generated when ||AIk|| hits the upper bounds of γ. A
clear illustration of the event-driven resilient synchronization
strategy is provided in Fig. 3.
The resilient action is completed by susbstituting the event-
driven resilient signals with the attacked signal based on the
local authentication signal according to:
ωk(t) = Ωkω
f
k (t) + (1− Ωk)ωk(te) (12)
Finally, the signal obtained in (12) is replaced with (2) to re-
alize the mitigation of stealth cyber attacks in AC microgrids.
As soon as the reconstructed signal in (12) obeys (1), the
authentication label transmitted to the neighbors is switched
back to T.
III. RESULTS
The proposed detection strategy has been tested in a dis-
tributed AC microgrid (as shown in Fig. 1) operating at a
Fig. 4. Performance of the proposed event-driven attack resilient controller
to follow (1) for different values of communication delay τd – Settling time
keeps increasing and even settle at another set-point with increase in τd.
global voltage and frequency reference of 311 V and 50 Hz,
respectively with N = 4 GfCs. Since each GfC is of equal
capacity of 10 kVA, the droop coefficients mk are equal and
hence, active power will be shared equally. Using the local
and neighboring measurements, the proposed resilient strategy
shown in Fig. 3 is modeled for every GfC to achieve resilient
synchronization. All the parameters are provided in Appendix.
In Fig. 4, the performance of the microgrid is tested for
different values of communication delay τd. As soon as the
attack is launched at t = 1 s, a trustworthy frequency signal
from the neighboring measurements is communicated to the
attacked unit. It can be seen in Fig. 4 that with increase
in the value of τd, the transient peak and the settling time
to the reference set-point keeps increasing. However, for
τd = 325 ms, it settles at another set-point. This behavior
can be explained owing to the microgrid’s operation within
the maximum communication delay τmaxd allowable for the
cooperative cyber graph [9]. As the delay in the network goes
beyond τmaxd , Lω = 0 will not hold true anymore, thereby
limiting the resilience capabilities of the proposed strategy.
Fig. 5. Response of GfCs to malfunctioning events – Any trajectory inside
the evaluation quadrant within 100 ms confirms the presence of cyber attack.
To differentiate between other malfunctioning events such
as line-to-ground (LG) fault, actuator fault and cyber attacks,
an evaluation theory for a GfC’s response is presented in Fig.
5 for a window of 100 ms. This has been analyzed using
a frequency-average voltage characteristics at the GfC bus
responding to the aforementioned events with the evaluation
quadrant ranging from within XY limits: [{Xmin = 0, Xmax
= ω
∗
2π }, {Ymin = 0, Ymax = V
∗}]. As it is evident from Fig. 5,
the inception of LG and actuator faults causes immediate drop
in voltages and frequency to zero, respectively. As they form
the boundaries of the defined quadrant, an unbalanced attack
of -50 Hz causes the trajectory to fall gradually towards zero
with movement inside the quadrant owing to the control layer
dynamics of the GfC. Hence, a trajectory movement inside
the evaluation boundary (within a certain time frame ≈ 100
ms) can be used locally as a substantial indicator to assist the
proposed scheme in differentiating between faults and cyber
attacks.
Fig. 6. Accuracy of signal reconstruction for different values of β in the
adaptive detection threshold γ.
Further, the accuracy of signal reconstruction is tested for
different values of β in adaptive threshold γ. As already
explained earlier that the first term in γ is to provide accuracy
in detection during transient conditions, it can be seen in Fig.
6 that the accuracy can vary significantly when β is less or
more than 1. When β < 1, the triggering instants become
higher with increase in settling time. However when β > 1,
it can lead to peaky transients (up to 50.08 Hz) before the
signal reconstruction is started, as the detection boundaries
have increased leading to a decreased settling time.
Fig. 7. Performance of N = 4 GfCs with agent II plugged out and in at t
= 2.5 & 4 s, respectively with agent I and III under a balanced attack at t
= 1.5 s – Resilient operation achieved only using ωT4 .
Finally, the resilience capability of the proposed strategy is
studied using only one trustworthy frequency input. In Fig.
7, it can be seen that the proposed detection mechanism does
TABLE I
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED RESILIENT STRATEGY IN AC MICROGRIDS.
Features [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] This letter
Computational burden High Medium Medium Low High Low
Resilience capability N
1
2
Case-dependent2 Case-dependent × N
2
N − 1
Cyber graph connectivity Existing Affected Limited Existing Existing Existing
Additional resources × × × × Virtual control layer ×
Detection of stealth attack × × × X × X
Mitigation of stealth attack × × × × × X
1 N denotes the total number of GfCs in AC microgrid.
2 It depends largely on the number of attacked cyber links/nodes, which ultimately affects the algebraic connectivity of cyber-graph.
not indicate any value above zero during a load change at t
= 0.5 s. However, when a balanced attack of ωa = 2π{0.75,
0, -0.75, 0} rad/s is injected at t = 1.5 s, AIk rises into the
positive region suggesting the presence of cyber attacks, which
validates the selectivity in detection of cyber attacks. As a
result, ωT2 and ω
T
4 are used to reconstruct signals immediately
for agent I and III, respectively. When agent II is plugged
out at t = 3.5 s, the incoming and outgoing communication
link from agent II is lost. As a result, agent I immediately
traverses to ωT4 to ensure resilient synchronization. Further
at t = 5 s, when agent II is plugged in back to the microgrid,
it can be seen that the frequency of all agents are restored
back to the reference value with active power shared equally
among each other. As agent II is uncompromised, ωT2 is again
made available for signal reconstruction. It can also be seen
in Fig. 7 that the average voltages of the active GfCs also
restore back to the voltage reference upon plug-in of agent II.
This justifies that the proposed scheme can provide resilient
synchronization for up to N − 1 attacked units.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this section, a comparative evaluation of the features
provided by the proposed resilient controller as opposed to
the existing solutions [3]-[7] has been provided in Table I.
As evident from Table I, the proposed scheme assigning low
computational burden provides resilience using the existing
cyber infrastructure against both balanced and unbalanced
attacks. Moreover, it provides a simple mitigation technique
to substitute a reconstructed trustworthy frequency signal. The
proposed method also offers the highest scale of resilience by
restoring the system even when N − 1 GfCs are attacked. In
[4]-[5], the resilience capability is highly dependent on limited
cyber graph connectivity, which may affect microgrid’s perfor-
mance even under the absence of attacks. On evaluating these
terms, the contributions of this letter enhance the resilience of
AC microgrids to a large extent in every aspect as compared
to the prior art.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A novel event-driven resilient control strategy is proposed to
mitigate stealth cyber attacks in AC microgrids. The proposed
strategy strategy is simple and offers the flexibility to build on
the existing control framework without using any additional
resources/information. Further, it offers the maximum scale of
resilience, since it is capable of establishing synchronization
even with N − 1 compromised GfCs. The robustness of
this theory has been tested under multiple scenarios and
malfunctioning events to restrict the triggering of events only
under the presence of cyber attacks without interfering in
the normal operation of microgrids. Further investigation on
providing resilience against stealth attacks on voltages can be
considered as a future scope of work in AC microgrids.
APPENDIX
Each GfC is equally rated with a capacity of 10 kVA. It
should be noted that the controller gains are consistent for
each GfC.
Plant: N = 4, Li= 1 mH, Cv= 10 µF, Lg= 3 mH, r1 = 0.8
Ω, r12 = 0.25 Ω, r23 = 0.75 Ω, r34 = 1.2 Ω, l12 = 2.4 mH,
l23 = 1.8 mH, l34 = 1.5 mH
Controller: ω∗ = 314.15 rad/s, V ∗ = 311 V, m = 0.0014, k1
= 320 , k2 = 500, β = 0.5, β0 = 0.01, l = 8.4
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